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Pleading to Stay in State Court: Forum
Control, Federal Removal Jurisdiction, and
the Amount in Controversy Requirement
Russell D. Jessee*
L Introduction
It is hornbook law that the plaintiff is master of his complaint Tradi-
tionally, a plaintiff's control of the complaint implied control to choose a state
or federal forum for a diversity case.2 According to the long-standing rule
of St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co.,3 if a plaintiff prefers a
state court forum and is willing to seek damages below the federal jurisdic-
tional amount, then the plaintiff may prevent a geographically diverse defen-
dant from removing to federal court.4 More recently, however, many states
have adopted procedural rules that do not limit recovery to the plaintiffs
* The author would like to thank Professor Laura S. Fitzgerald, Thomas M. Hayes,
Timothy J. Keefer, Richard W. Smith, and Jill L. Schultz for their help in writing, revising, and
editing this Note. The author would also like to thank his wife Julia and his daughter Emily for
their love, support, and patience.
1. See 14B CHARLESALANWRIGHTETAL., FEDERAL PRACTICEANDPRocEDURE§ 3702,
at 46 (3d ed. 1998) ("[P]laintiff is the master of his or her claim; if the plaintiff chooses to ask
for less than the jurisdictional amount, only the sum actually demanded is in controversy."); see
also The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22,25 (1913) ("Of course the party who
brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon .... ).
2. See Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 353 (1961) (stating that general
federal rule is that complaint determines amount in controversy and, consequently, federal or
state jurisdiction); Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 538 (1939) (stating that plaintiffs
pleading controls question of separable controversy, thereby controlling possibility of removal
to federal court).
3. 303 U.S. 283 (1938).
4. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 294 (1938) (stating
that if plaintiff wants to avoid federal court, "he may resort to the expedient of suing for less
than the jurisdictional amount, and though he would be justly entitled to more, the defendant
cannot remove"); see also IA JAMES WM. MOORE & BRETT A. RINGLE, MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE 0.158, at 203-04 (2d ed. 1996) (discussing validity of St. Paul Mercury's "expedi-
ent" to prevent removal); 14C WRiGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 3725, at 84-85 & n.20 (stating
that plaintiff may prevent removal even when claim is for more than jurisdictional amount by
choosing to bring state action for less than statutory minimum).
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demand.' In these states, civil plaintiffs may now receive awards greater than
the specific amounts prayed for in their complaints.' A plaintiff may force a
defendant to litigate in a state forum, yet the defendant may stand to lose more
than the jurisdictional amount. Thus, federal courts are beginning to allow
defendants to challenge the validity of a specifically pleaded damage amount.'
A court allowing a removing defendant to challenge a plaintiff s specific
damages then confronts the question of what burden the defendant should bear
to show that the requisite amount truly is in controversy! Federal judges have
proposed three different standards.9 First, the "reverse legal certainty" stan-
dard1" requires a defendant to show that it is not a legal certainty that the
plaintiff would recover less than the jurisdictional amount." Stated simply,
5. See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text (discussing state counterparts to Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c) permitting judgment in excess of pleaded amount of dam-
ages).
6. See infra notes 104-06 and accompanying text (explaining effect of state counterparts
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c)).
7. See, e.g., McCool v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 4:98CV71-B-B, 1998 WL
527280, at *2 (N.D. Miss. July 20, 1998) (allowing defendant to challenge plaintiff's specifi-
cally pleaded damages of $74,480 because plaintiff possibly could amend initial damages to
seek more); Parnell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 173 F.R.D. 446, 447 (W.D. Ky. 1997)
(stating that plaintiff may claim amount below federal requirement in complaint to defeat
jurisdiction while actually seeking and obtaining damages in excess of requirement); Lane v.
Champion Int'l Corp., 844 F. Supp. 724, 731-32 (S.D. Ala. 1994) (recognizing that plaintiffs
may manipulate pleadings and defeat constitutional purpose of diversity jurisdiction); Vail v.
Orkin Exterminating Co., No. 91-C-3053, 1991 WL 134275, at *2 (N.D. I11. July 12, 1991)
(stating that plaintiff was not limited to amount pleaded in her ad dainum clause and therefore
amount cannot govern removal); Cole v. Freightliner Corp., No. 91-C-733, 1991 WL 42163,
at *1 (N.D. II. Mar. 21, 1991) (according plaintiff's complaint deference but entertaining
possibility that he might recover more than jurisdictional amount); Corwin Jeep Sales & Serv.,
Inc. v. American Motors Sales Corp., 670 F. Supp. 591, 596 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (stating that
plaintiff may not defeat removal by seeking less than jurisdictional amount when court is
informed that amount in controversy exceeds required amount); Steele v. Underwriters Adjust-
ing Co., 649 F. Supp. 1414, 1416 (M.D. Ala. 1986) ("A plaintiff should not be allowed to
deprive a defendant of his right to remove through artful pleading practices.").
8. See Bums v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (1 lth Cir. 1994) ("So, the critical
question is to what extent must defendant prove jurisdiction exists despite plaintiff's express
claim to less than the minimum jurisdictional sum?").
9. See infra notes 10-16 and accompanying text (discussing three standards for removing
defendants).
10. See Kliebertv. Upjohn Co., 915 F.2d 142,147-48(5th Cir. 1990) (Jolly, J., dissenting)
(proposing "reverse legal certainty" standard as correct burden for removing defendant), vacated
for reh 'g en bane, 923 F.2d 47 (5th Cir.), appeal dism 'dper stipulation ofsettlement, 947 F.2d
736 (5th Cir. 1991). Courts also refer to the "reverse legal certainty" standard as the "converse
legal certainty" test or standard. See De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1411 (5th Cir.
1995) [hereinafter De Aguilar II] (describing standard as "converse legal certainty" standard).
11. See infra notes 129-31, 144-46 and accompanying text (discussing "reverse legal
certainty" standard).
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a defendant bears the burden of showing only that the plaintiff possibly could
recover more than the jurisdictional amount. 2 Second, the "preponderance
of the evidence" standard 3 attempts to strike a balance between a plaintiff's
right to choose a state forum and a defendant's right to remove by requiring
a defendant to prove the jurisdictional amount by a preponderance of the
evidence. 4 Third, the stringent "legal certainty" standard"5 forces a defendant
to prove to a legal certainty that a prevailing plaintiff cannot recover less than
the jurisdictional amount. 6
This Note explores the three removal standards by examining two federal
court of appeals opinions regarding removed cases with specified damages
below the jurisdictional amount: one opinion in which the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit adopted the "legal certainty" stan-
dard and one in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
adopted the "preponderance of the evidence" standard. Part II.A provides an
overview of the statutory basis for removal to federal court. 7 Part II.B
identifies changing judicial attitudes toward specifically pleading jurisdiction-
ally insufficient damages to secure a state court forum.' Part II concludes
with an examination of case law preceding the current willingness of some
courts to allow defendants to attempt to remove facially unremovable cases. 9
Part ILI.A analyzes Kliebert v. Upjohn Co.,2" a vacated Fifth Circuit opinion
from whose reasoning both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits drew heavily in
later opinions.2 Part II.B examines the Eleventh Circuit's adoption of
12. See infra notes 129-31, 144-46 and accompanying text (discussing "reverse legal
certainty" standard).
13. See De Aguilar 11, 47 F.3d at 1412 (establishing "preponderance of the evidence"
standard as equitable burden for removing defendant).
14. See infra note 238 and accompanying text (discussing competing interests that
"preponderance of the evidence" standard balances).
15. See Bums v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095-96 (1 lth Cir. 1994) (establishing
"legal certainty" standard as appropriate burden on removing defendant).
16. See infra Part IV.C (discussing aptness of"legal certainty" standard).
17. See infra Part II.A (summarizing federal removal statutes).
18. See infra Part II.B (identifying conflict between Fifth and Eleventh Circuits' standards
for defendants removing actions with jurisdictionally insufficient damages).
19. See infra Part II.C-E (examining traditional judicial approach to attempted removal
ofjurisdictionally insufficient claims and exploring effect of new pleading rules on traditional
approach).
20. 915 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1990).
21. See infra Part III.A (examining Kliebert opinion). In Kliebert, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that for aremoving defendantto sustain federaljurisdiction, the defendant must show
to a legal certainty that thejurisdictional amount is in controversy. Kliebert v. Upjohn Co., 915
F.2d 142, 146-47 (5th Cir. 1990), vacated for reh'g en banc, 923 F.2d 47 (5th Cir.), appeal
dism 'dper stipulation of settlement, 947 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1991). The Fifth Circuit then
vacated its opinion forrehearing en banc. Kliebertv. Upjohn Co., 923 F.2d47 (5th Cir.), appeal
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Kliebert's "legal certainty" standard Part III.C examines the Fifth Circuit's
decision to adopt the more permissive "preponderance of the evidence"
standard and to reject Kliebert.23 Part IV analyzes removal standards in light
of the historical and practical reasons for Congress's statutory requirement
that a minimum amount be in controversy in order to restrict access to federal
courts in diversity cases.24 Part V concludes that the difficult "legal certainty"
burden is preferable because it comports more closely with the rationale of the
jurisdictional amount than does the less onerous "preponderance of the
evidence" standard or the permissive "reverse legal certainty" standard.'
I. Removal to Federal Court and the Amount in Controversy Requirement
Removal is a peculiar procedure in that it permits defendants to remove an
action properly brought in one system of courts, our state courts, into
another set of courts, our federal district courts.
26
A. Applicable Federal Statutes
A defendant who seeks to remove a diversity case to federal court con-
fronts several sections of United States Code Title 28, including § 1332,
§ 1441, § 1446, and § 1447.27 The process begins with the general removal
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which provides that
any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the
United States have originaljurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant
or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district
and division embracing the place where such action is pending.'
Original subject matter jurisdiction in federal courts for diversity of citizen-
ship cases requires, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, a minimum amount in
dism'dperstipulation ofsettlement, 947 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1991). The parties then settled, and
the court dismissed the appeal. Kliebert v. Upjohn Co., 947 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1991).
22. See infra Part III.B (examining Eleventh Circuit's adoption of "legal certainty"
standard).
23. See infra Part III.C (examining Fifth Circuit's adoption of "preponderance of the
evidence" standard).
24. See infra Part IV (discussing three removal standards and their applicability to cases
in which plaintiffs plead specific damages below jurisdictional amount).
25. See infra Part V (concluding that "legal certainty" standard provides better fit with
rationale of minimum amount in controversy requirement than do more permissive standards).
26. 16 JAMEs WM. MOOREETAL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAc1ICE § 107.03, at 107-19 (3d
ed. 1998).
27. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332,1441,1446,1447 (1994&Supp.I 11996) (providingremoval
regime).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
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controversy and opposing parties from different states.29 Section 1441(b)
additionally requires that no defendant be a citizen of the forum state. °
Section 1446 governs removal procedure." Under § 1446, a removing
defendant must file a removal notice with the district court within thirty days
of receipt of the initial pleading setting forth a removable claim or within
thirty days of notification that the action is removable. 2 Section 1446 further
29. See 28U.S.C. § 1332(1994&Supp. 11996) (granting originaljurisdictionto federal
district courts for civil actions in which amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and is between
citizens of different states). Specifically, § 1332 grants jurisdiction when the requisite amount
is in controversy and the action
is between (1) citizens of different States; (2) citizens of a State and citizens or
subjects of a foreign state; (3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or
subjects of a foreign state are additional parties; and (4) a foreign state, defined in
section 1603 (a) of this title, as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994).
This Note examines a specific problem involving the amount in controversy requirement
for removal of diversity cases. Problems involving geographical diversity ofparties are beyond
its scope. Unless otherwise noted, parties have stipulated or courts have determined that geo-
graphic diversity exists. For thorough discussions of the rules to determine the citizenship of
parties, see 15 MOORE ET AL., supra note 26, §§ 102.30-102.58, and 13B WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICEAND PROCEDURE §§ 3611-3630(2d ed. 1984 & Supp. 1998), which provide
detailed examinations of case law governing determining citizenship of individuals, corpora-
tions, and other entities.
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1994) ("Any [diversity] action shall be removable only if
none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State
in which such action is brought.").
31. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (1994 & Supp. 111996) (stating requirements of filing notice
of removal, of contents of removal notice, and oftime limits for filing notice with court and for
notice to parties for civil actions).
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), (b) (1994) (stating procedural requirements for removal
from state court to federal district court). Subsections (a) and (b) of § 1446 state:
(a) A defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil action or criminal
prosecution from a State court shall file in the district court of the United States for
the district and division within which such action is pending a notice of removal
signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and containing
a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal, together with a copy of all
process, pleadings, and orders served upon such defendant or defendants in such
action.
(b) The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within thirty
days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of
the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or
proceeding is based, or within thirty days after the service of summons upon the
defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not required to
be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.
If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal
may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or
otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from
which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become remov-
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provides that no defendant may remove a case more than one year after the
plaintiff commences the action.33
Once a defendant has removed a case to federal court; a plaintiff desiring
to petition for remand based on a procedural defect must file within thirty
days. 4 However, if the district court discovers that it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction at any time before final judgment, § 1447 requires remand even
without a petition from the plaintiff.35 Furthermore, should a district court
remand a case to state court, appellate courts typically cannot review the
order.
3 6
able, exceptthat a case may not be removed on the basis ofjurisdiction conferred by
section 1332 of this title more than 1 year after commencement of the action.
Id.
33. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (stating that "a case may not be removed on the basis of
jurisdiction conferred by section 1332 of this title more than 1 year after commencement of the
action"). Congress added the one-year limit in 1988 as part of the Judicial Improvements and
Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1016(b)(2)(B), 102 Stat. 4642, 4669 (1988)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)). "The result [ofthe limit] is a modest curtailment
in access to diversity jurisdiction." H.R. REP. No. 100-889, at 72 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982,6032. Congress was concerned that settlement with a diversity-destroying
defendant on the eve of trial would permit removal "late in the proceedings [that] may result in
substantial delay and disruption." H.R. REP. No. 100-889, at 72, reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6033. A plaintiff may also creatively plead so as to potentially recover more
than thejurisdictional amount and yet preclude a defendant from removing to federal court. See
Jack E. Karns, Removal to Federal Court and the Jurisdictional Amount in Controversy
Pursuant to State Statutory Limitations on Pleading Damage Claims, 29 CREIGiTroN L. REv.
1091, 1096 (1996) (outlining scenario whereby plaintiff uses one-year limit to remain in state
court yet ultimately asserts claim for more than jurisdictional amount). By originally pleading
less than the jurisdictional amount and then waiting more than a year to amend the complaint
to include a higher amount, a plaintiff could thwart a defendant who wishes to remove. Id
34. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (Supp. 111996) (stating that "[a] motion to remand the case
on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30
days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a)").
35. Id
36. See 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) (1994) (stating that "[a]n order remanding a case to the State
court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise," except for civil
rights cases removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443). In Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermans-
dorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976), however, the United States Supreme Court permitted appellate
review of a remand order when the district courtjudge remanded the case on grounds not found
in § 1447(c). See id. at 349-52 (discussing lack of congressional intent to extend ban on
appellate review of remand to remand based on grounds not specified in removal statute). In
Gravitt v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 430 U.S. 723 (1977) (per curiam), the Supreme
Court distinguished Thermtron and reaffirmed that § 1447(c) remands are not subject to
appellate review. Id. at 723-24. The Seventh Circuit construed these two opinions to allow
review of a district court's remand of a properly removed case based on a subsequent stipulation
by the plaintiff that destroyed federal jurisdiction. See In re Shell Oil Co., 966 F.2d 1130, 1132
(7th Cir. 1992) (discussing propriety of appellate review of remanded case). However, if a
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B. Using the Jurisdictional Amount to Choose a Forum
Since the inception of removal jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1789,
its exercise in diversity cases has required a minimum amount in contro-
versy." Originally, the section of the Judiciary Act establishing removal
jurisdiction specified a jurisdictional amount of $500.38 Now, a defendant
may remove any action to federal district court over which the court would
have original jurisdiction. 9 Thus, in order for today's defendant to remove
a diversity case, the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000 as provided
by the federal statute granting original diversityjurisdictionto federal courts.4°
Historically, the jurisdictional amount has provided plaintiffs a certain
amount of forum control." A plaintiff may prefer state court for procedural
and tactical reasons, including a belief that a local jury will be partial to local
residents.42 Conversely, a defendant may prefer federal court for fear of
biased local judges and juries 3 Congress in 1789 recognized that fear when
it created removal jurisdiction to protect nonresident defendants from locally-
biased state courts." Regardless of a defendant's fears or motivations, the
remanding district judge believes a case lacked jurisdiction from the outset, § 1447(d) makes
the remand unreviewable. In re Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 964 F.2d 706,708 (7th Cir.
1992). Thus, "[j]ust which remands are reviewable depends on the reasons the district court
provides." In re Shell Oil Co., 966 F.2d at 1132.
37. See Thomas E. Baker, The History and Tradition of the Amount in Controversy
Requirement: A Proposal to "Up the Ante" in Diversity Jurisdiction, 102 F.R.D. 299,302 ("As
long as we have had federal courts, Congress has used the requirement of an amount in
controversy to limit original and derivative access to the lower federal courts.").
38. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79 (providing that defendant may remove
from state court to federal court suit in which matter in dispute exceeds $500 and in-state
plaintiff is suing nonresident defendant).
39. See supra Part H.A (providing overview of statutory basis for removal).
40. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994 & Supp. 111996) (granting originaljurisdictionto federal
district courts for civil actions in which amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and is between
citizens of different states); see also supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (explaining
interaction of federal diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, with removal statutes).
41. See infra notes 66-77 and accompanying text (discussing plaintiff's ability to choose
state forum by pleading damages below federal jurisdictional amount).
42. See 1A MOORE & RINGLE, supra note 4, 0.158, at 199-200 & n.5 (observing
possibility that state tribunal may not be impartial between its own citizens and nonresidents
(citing Heniford v. American Motors Sales Corp., 471 F. Supp. 328, 335 (D.S.C. 1979))).
43. See Grassi v. Ciba-Geigy, Ltd., 894 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir. 1990) (discussing
potential local bias against nonresident defendant in case in which plaintiffs attempted to avoid
removal by assigning fractional interest in disputed property to nondiverse party).
44. See 14B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 3721, at 289 ("[The right of removal
probably was designed to protect nonresidents from the local prejudices of state courts."); cf
IA MooRE& RINGLE, supra note 4, 0.157[13], at 193-94 (discussing reasons why defendant
may forego or exercise right of removal).
657
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amount of damages a plaintiff seeks in state court determines whether the
defendant has the choice to remove to federal court.45
Two circuits of the United States courts of appeals, however, recently
eroded the efficacy of pleading a specific amount below the jurisdictional
minimum as a means of insuring a state court forum.'46 In Burns v. Windsor
Insurance Co. ,7 the Eleventh Circuit considered the question of what burden
a removing defendant must shoulder to establish jurisdiction despite a plain-
tiffs specific claim for less than the jurisdictional amount.48 The Burns court
determined that the defendant's burden must be a heavy one.49 The court
concluded that for the case to remain in federal court, the defendant must
prove to a legal certainty that the plaintiff's claim exceeds the jurisdictional
amount. 0 The Fifth Circuit considered the same question in De Aguilar v.
Boeing Co. (De Aguilar I)"' and rejected the "legal certainty" standard in
favor of a more permissive one.52 According to the De Aguilar II court, "the
plaintiff s claim remains presumptively correct unless the defendant can show
by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy is greater
than the jurisdictional amount.
5 3
C. A Recent Example of Removal Thwarted: The Traditional Approach
Hicks v. Universal Housing, Inc.,,' a case decided by the United States
District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, provides an example
of how the statutory jurisdictional amount traditionally restricts access to
federal courts in conformity with a plaintiffs preference.55 In Hicks, the
plaintiff originally filed a civil action seeking damages of $49,900 in the
45. See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (discussing bright line nature of federal
jurisdictional amount).
46. See infra notes 47-53 and accompanying text (discussing different court of appeals
approaches to removing defendant's burden when specific damages are jurisdictionally insuf-
ficient).
47. 31 F.3d 1092 (11th Cir. 1994).
48. See Bums v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (1 1th Cir. 1994) (considering
what standard applies to defendant who seeks to remove case in which plaintiff pleads specific
damages below jurisdictional amount).
49. Id
50. See id. (explaining defendant's "legal certainty" burden of proof).
51. 47 F.3d 1404 (5th Cir. 1995).
52. See DeAguilarI,47 F.3d 1404, 1411 (5th Cir. 1995) (rejecting defendant's burden
of showing to legal certainty that plaintiff's claim exceedsjurisdictional amount as too onerous).
53. Id at 1412.
54. 792 F. Supp. 482 (S.D. W. Va. 1992).
55. See Hicks v. Universal Hous., Inc., 792 F. Supp. 482, 485 (S.D. W. Va. 1992)
(determining that defendant could not remove action for $49,900, $100 below jurisdictional
amount at time).
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Circuit Court of McDowell County, West Virginia. 6 The plaintiff, William
Hicks, claimed that the defendant, Universal Housing, Inc., had faultily
designed and constructed his mobile home and then damaged it during deliv-
ery.57 The court observed that plaintiff s counsel candidly admitted to drafting
the complaint in order to stay in state court." The defendant timely removed
to federal court and alleged that the true amount in controversy, exclusive of
interests and costs, exceeded $50,000, then the jurisdictional amount.59 The
court found the conclusion "inescapable" that the plaintiff s case as originally
filed - demanding $100 short of the threshold amount - was not removable.60
The allegations of the plaintiff's complaint as they exist at the time the
defendant files its petition for removal control the amount in controversy, the
court stated.61 Thus, the court determined that it had no jurisdiction and
remanded the case to the McDowell County Circuit Court.62 Otherwise, the
court stated, the concept ofjurisdiction would be changeable at the will of the
court in order to fit circumstances.63
D. The Legacy of St. Paul Mercury
The Hicks court relied on the "time-tested principles" of St. Paul Mer-
cury and Iowa Central Railway Co. v. Bacon,' two United States Supreme
Court opinions.6" The Supreme Court's decision in St. Paul Mercury, now
sixty years old, still provides the basis for discussion of the jurisdictional
amount in removal cases.' The Court's assertion that a plaintiff may ensure
a state court forum by pleading damages less than the jurisdictional amount
and thereby bar removal is of particular relevance.67 However, the Supreme
Court actually established the bright line nature of the jurisdictional amount




60. Id. at 484.
61. Id.
62. Id at 485.
63. Id. at 484.
64. 236 U.S. 305 (1915).
65. See Hicks v. Universal Hous., Inc., 792 F. Supp. 482, 483-84 (S.D. W. Va. 1992)
(citing St. Paul Mercury and Iowa Central).
66. See De Aguilar 11, 47 F.3d 1404, 1408-09 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Most discussions of
jurisdictional amount in removal cases begin with St. Paul Mercury.").
67. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 294 (1938) (stating
that "[i]f [the plaintiff] does not desire to try his case in the federal court he may resort to the
expedient of suing for less than the jurisdictional amount, and though he would be justly
entitled to more, the defendant cannot remove").
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twenty-three years before St. Paul Mercury.68 In 1915, the Court in Iowa
Central stated that if a complaint seeks less than the jurisdictional amount on
its face, the case is not removable;69 however, the St. Paul Mercury Court
failed to cite Iowa Central.
In Iowa Central, L.M. Bacon, administrator of the estate of Martin W.
Lockhart, requested ajudgment of$1990 -$10 below the $2000jurisdictional
amount at the time - in Iowa state court against Iowa Central Railway Com-
pany.70 The wrongful death complaint also contained a statement alleging
damages of$ 10,000.71 Iowa Central unsuccessfully sought to remove the case
to federal court.' After losing in state court and after the Iowa Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment, Iowa Central appealed to the United States Supreme
Court." Iowa Central posed the federal question of "whether the state court
had lost its jurisdiction by the attempted removal to the United States Circuit
Court."'74 The Iowa Central Court confirmed that if "upon the face of the
record.., the suit does not appear to be removable," then the state court retains
jurisdiction.75 The Court concluded that because the plaintiffs prayer for
recovery was for $1990, the federal district court did not have jurisdiction.76
The proposition that specifically pleaded damages below the jurisdic-
tional amount bar the door to federal court reappeared for good in St. Paul
Mercury." Although courts and commentators often cite St. PaulMercury for
that proposition," the "rule" only surfaced as dictum.79 The question before
68. See infra notes 69-76 and accompanying text (discussing Iowa Central).
69. See Iowa Cent. Ry. Co. v. Bacon, 236 U.S. 305,310 (1915) (finding that state court
did not lose jurisdiction of case because recovery sought by prayer for damages was below
federal jurisdictional amount).
70. Id. at 308.
71. Id





77. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283,294 (1938) ("If [the
plaintiff] does not desire to try his case in the federal court he may resort to the expedient of
suing for less than the jurisdictional amount, and though he would be justly entitled to more,
the defendant cannot remove.").
78. See, e.g., Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 366 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing St.
Paul Mercury for proposition that plaintiff may evade federal court by seeking less than
jurisdictional amount); Parnell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 173 F.1RD. 446,447 (W.D.
Ky. 1997) (same); Hicks v. Universal Hous., Inc., 792 F. Supp. 482, 484 (S.D. W. Va. 1992)
(same); IA MOORE& RINGLE, supra note 4, 0.158, at 203-04 & n. 16 (same); 14C WRIGHTET
AL., supra note 1, § 3725, at 84-85 & n.20 (same).
79. See St. Paul Mercury, 303 U.S. at 294 (explaining that voluntary postremoval reduc-
tion of demand does not defeat federal jurisdiction).
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the Court in St. Paul Mercury was whether a postremoval amendment could
oust federal jurisdiction when at the time of removal the complaint demanded
an amount sufficient forjurisdiction." Red Cab Company originally sued St.
Paul Mercury Indemnity Company in the Superior Court of Marion County,
Indiana."' Red Cab alleged that St. Paul Mercury was liable for $4000 in
damages for its failure to pay claims under a thirty-day insurance binder. 2
St. Paul Mercury timely removed to federal district court after which Red
Cab filed two amended complaints, the second of which contained an exhibit
showing actual damages of $1,380.89.83 Red Cab did not move to remand,
however, and recovered $1,162.98 in a bench trial in the district court." St.
Paul Mercury appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit, which ruled that Red Cab's actual claim was below the
jurisdictional amount of $3000 and that the district court had been without
jurisdiction." On appeal, the United States Supreme Court first ruled that for
cases originally brought in federal court, the plaintiff's good faith demand
controlsjurisdiction, and "[i]t must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is
really for less than thejurisdictional amount to justify dismissal."" The Court
then concluded that dismissal would not have beenjustified if the plaintiffhad
brought the suit in federal court.8 7 Observing that the defendant removed the
case in question from state court, the Court further stated that principles
governing remand strongly supported the suit remaining in federal court.8
The Court reasoned that in an original action the plaintiff has chosen a
federal forum and a defendant may challenge the plaintiffs good faith in
choosing that forum. 9 The Court then stated:
A different situation is presented in the case of a suit instituted in a state
court and thence removed. There is a strong presumption that the plaintiff
has not claimed a large amount in order to confer jurisdiction on a federal
court or that the parties have colluded to that end.'
80. See id at 284 (stating question of case).
81. Id
82. Id at 284-85.
83. Id. at 285.
84. Id
85. Id.
86. Id at 288-89.
87. Id at 290.
88. Id.
89. Id The Court observed that in an original action in federal court, the plaintiff and
defendant may have colluded to confer jurisdiction. Id. The Court also observed that in a
removal situation a plaintiff's state court claim in excess ofthe jurisdictional minimum was not
likely to have been made in a roundabout effort to reach federal court. Id at 290-91.
90. Id
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Some commentators interpret this portion of the St. PaulMercury decision as
establishing differing standards for dismissal and removal: dismissal requires
the appearance to a legal certainty that the plaintiff's claim is below the
jurisdictional amount, but in a removal situation a court should strongly
presume the validity of the plaintiff s claim.9' Regardless, the Court in St.
Paul Mercury confronted a removed action, and it found that in such a case,
the plaintiff's complaint controls the status of the action.' Thus, subsequent
events reducing the amount in controversy, whether at the instigation of the
plaintiff or beyond the plaintiff's control, do not defeat federal jurisdiction.93
Modem federal courts generally interpret St. Paul Mercury's "legal
certainty" test as applying only to cases in which the plaintifforiginally claims
damages in excess of the jurisdictional amount, whether the plaintiff origi-
nally brings the case in federal court or in state court.94 At least one federal
district court has determined that the test applies only to motions to dismiss
an original federal action and is inappropriate for a remand action regardless
of the amount the plaintiff originally demands.95 Thus, St. Paul Mercury
91. See, e.g., 16MOOREETAL.,supra note 26, § 107.14[2][g][i], at 107-65 (stating that
if amount in controversy is in doubt, Supreme Court in St. Paul Mercury drew "sharp distinc-
tion" between original jurisdiction and removal jurisdiction); 14C WRiGHT ET AL., supra note
1, § 3725, at 78 ("The judicial standard applied in removed cases to test the jurisdictional
sufficiency of the amount in controversy when the plaintiff's complaint claims more than
$75,000 is a simpler one, involving less strict scrutiny, than that applied to suits brought
originally in federal court."); Quentin F. Urquhart Jr., Amount in Controversy and Removal:
Current Trends and Strategic Considerations, 62 DEF. CouNs. J. 509, 515 (1995) (stating that
"the Court in St. Paul set forth two completely distinct set of rules" for original actions and
removed actions).
92. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 291-92 (1938).
93. Id. at 293.
94. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 402 (9th Cir. 1996)
(stating that St. Paul Mercury "legal certainty" test is only applicable when plaintiff pleads
damages in excess of jurisdictional amount whether in state or federal court); Tapscott v. MS
Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1356-57 (1 th Cir. 1996) (rejecting "legal certainty" test in
removal case in which plaintiff did not specify damages); Allen v. R&H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d
1326, 1335 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that "legal certainty" rule applies when plaintiff s demand
exceeds jurisdictional amount, but plaintiff generally can bar defendant from removal by
pleading less than jurisdictional amount); Gafford v. General Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 160 (6th
Cir. 1993) (stating that "legal certainty" test arose in case in which plaintiff s demand exceeded
jurisdictional amount); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566-67 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying
"preponderance of the evidence," not "legal certainty," standard when amount of plaintiffs
damages was unclear); McCorkindale v. American Home Assurance Co., 909 F. Supp. 646,651
(N.D. Iowa 1995) (stating that "legal certainty" rule applies only to cases in which plaintiff
originally claims damages in excess ofjurisdictional amount); Garza v. Bettcher Indus., Inc.,
752 F. Supp. 753, 755 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (stating that St. Paul Mercury's test "is limited in
utility to cases in which the plaintiff himself has placed the requisite jurisdictional amount in
controversy by requesting damages in excess of the jurisdictional amount").
95. See Landmark Corp. v. Apogee Coal Co., 945 F. Supp. 932, 935 n.2 (S.D. W. Va.
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answers several removal questions while leaving others uncertain or unad-
dressed. First, the "legal certainty" test definitely applies to actions originally
filed in federal court in which the plaintiff alleges damages in excess of the
jurisdictional amount.' Second, after removal, a plaintiff may not reduce the
original demand in order to return to state court.97 However, the St. Paul
Mercury decision leaves uncertain what standard applies when a plaintiff
challenges jurisdiction after removal and the original complaint alleges
damages exceeding the jurisdictional amount, although federal courts tend to
extend the "legal certainty" test to such removal situations.98 The St. Paul
Mercury Court also did not address the question of what standard applies to
a case in which the plaintiff does not specify damages and the defendant
removes to federal court.9 Finally, the Court did not address the question of
1996) ("Mhe legal certainty test initially formulated by the United States Supreme Court inRed
Cab is inappropriate for remand actions .... ).
96. Seesupra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (discussingSt. PaulMercury's test for
dismissal).
97. See supra notes 80-93 and accompanying text (discussing central issue of St. Paul
Mercury and its resolution that plaintiff's subsequent stipulation reducing demand has no effect
on jurisdiction after removal).
98. See Gafford v. General Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 157 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding general
agreement among federal courts that "legal certainty" standard of St. Paul Mercury "should
apply to cases removed to federal court from state court where the plaintiff's prayer for damages
in the state suit exceeds the federal amount-in-controversy requirement"). But see Landmark,
945 F. Supp. at 935 ("[Ihe 'legal certainty' test expressly applies only in instances in which
a plaintiff invokes federal jurisdiction by filing a case in federal court."); Urquhart, supra note
91, at 515-16 (stating that although argument may be made for "legal certainty" test applying
in remand situation, language of St. Paul Mercury indicates that plaintiff's allegation of
jurisdictionally sufficient damages "fixes" right to remove andjurisdiction becomes essentially
unchallengeable, thus "legal certainty" test should not apply to removed cases).
99. See Urquhart, supra note 91, at 516 (finding that St. Paul Mercury does not address
all removal situations). Determining a defendant's right to remove a diversity case to federal
court is especially problematic when a plaintiff does not specify the exact amount of damages
sought and leaves the amount in controversy indeterminate. See Allen v. R&H Oil & Gas Co.,
63 F.3d 1326, 1335-36 (5th Cir. 1995) (examining what constitutes acceptable proof to
determine amount in controversy when plaintiff does not specify damages). Complaints with
unspecified damages are increasingly common as "numerous states have enacted procedural
rules prohibiting plaintiffs from stating damages in a complaint above a set amount." Karns,
supra note 33, at 1092. United States courts of appeals have articulated the following three
standards for a defendant to meet in showing that the jurisdictional amount truly is in contro-
versy: (1) a defendant must show that it is legally certain that should the defendant lose the
plaintiff will recover more than the jurisdictional amount, (2) a defendant must prove that the
plaintiffs claim more likely than not meets the jurisdictional amount, or (3) a defendant must
show by a preponderance of the evidence or to a reasonable probability that more than the
jurisdictional amount is in controversy. Id. at 1093-94. Not only are the courts of appeals's
decisions inconsistent, but district courts often misconstrue or misapply their circuit's standard.
Id. at 1094, 1119. At least one commentator has favored the "preponderance of the evidence"
standard when a defendant seeks to remove a case with unspecified damages. See Urquhart,
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what standard should apply to a case in which a plaintiff specifies damages
below the jurisdictional amount, yet a defendant still seeks to remove."° Of
course, at the time, the Court's understanding that in such a case the defendant
simply could not remove obviated the last question."'
E. The Effect of New Procedural Rules
Now, however, a majority of states have counterparts to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(c), °2 which, except in default cases, do not limit a plain-
tiffs recovery to the complaint's ad damnum, or damages, clause.'0 3 Rule
supra note 91, at 516-17 (examining and approving of recent court of appeals cases adopting
"preponderance of evidence" standard). Another commentator has suggested that modem courts
should move beyond St. Paul Mercury and consider subsequent pleadings and stipulations in
determining jurisdiction regardless of what standard governs removaljurisdiction. See Kams,
supra note 33, at 1111-21 (examining recent court of appeals removal standards and concluding
that courts should consider subsequent pleadings and stipulations when damages originally are
unspecified because of state pleading rule).
One commentator has proposed a single standard-the party invoking federaljurisdiction
must establish that it is not legally and not factually impossible for the plaintiffto recover more
than thejurisdictional amount-to govern removal decisions for cases with either an "indetermi-
nate complaint" or a "lowball complaint." See Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Removal of Diversity
Actions When the Amount in Controversy Cannot Be Determinedfrom the Face of Plaintifs
Complaint: The Needfor Judicial andStatutory Reform to Preserve Defendant's EqualAccess
to Federal Courts, 62 MO. L.REV. 681,699-728 (1997) (proposing judicial review of removed
claims, whether indeterminate or lowball, under one form of reverse legal certainty standard).
Alice M. Noble-Allgire has argued that the same removal standard that applies to indeterminate
complaints should apply to complaints with specifically pleaded, jurisdictionally insufficient
damages because many states' procedural rules permit recovery in excess of pleaded damages.
See id. at 691-92. This Note, however, treats indeterminate and lowball complaints as present-
ing separate problems. It treats a plaintiff's ability to recover more than a specifically pleaded
amount as a factor affecting a court's decision to allow a defendant to challenge a specific
damage claim in the first place, not as a reason to equate indeterminate complaints with lowball
complaints. See infra Part II.E; see also infra note 198 (discussing one federal court distin-
guishing between specific and indeterminate claims for damages).
100. See Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1096 n.6 (1 Ith Cir. 1994) (finding that
St. PaulMercury is not applicable when defendant challenges plaintiff's specificjurisdictionally
insufficient damages); Urquhart, supra note 91, at 517 (same).
101. See supranotes 67-69, 75-77 and accompanying text (discussing St. PaulMercury's
assertion that plaintiff may ensure state court forum by pleading damages below jurisdictional
amount).
102. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(c). Rule 54(c) states:
Ajudgment by default shall not be different in kind from or exceed in amount that
prayed for in the demand for judgment. Except as to a party against whom a
judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which
the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not de-
manded such relief in the party's pleadings.
Id
103. 14C WIGHT ETAL., supra note 1, § 3725, at 96.
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54(c) allows a trier of fact to grant relief to a party as it sees fit regardless of
what the party demanded in its pleadings.' 4 A specific claim for damages,
however, must retain some usefulness. If courts view state counterparts to
Rule 54(c) as putting an unlimited amount in controversy, then "the principle
that a party may defeat removal by limiting the claim to less than the required
amount would have no application in such states absent a binding stipulation
on the matter."' 5 Still, under state counterparts to Rule 54(c), a plaintiff may
claim to seek less than the jurisdictional amount in order to stay in state court
while actually seeking and potentially recovering damages in excess of the
federal jurisdictional amount.'0°
This possibility of manipulation-the possibility thata plaintiff may deny
a federal forum to a geographically diverse defendant yet may recover more
than the jurisdictional amount - argues for reexamining St. Paul Mercury's
assumption that a jurisdictionally insufficient demand should always ensure
a state forum.0 7 However, at least one treatise author has contended that
courts should follow the St. PaulMercury decision and allow a plaintiff s good
faith complaint to set the amount in controversy.' Otherwise, in states with
rules similar to Rule 54(c), the state rules would effectively abolish the juris-
dictional amount as a restriction on removal."° Nonetheless, federal courts are
beginning to allow defendants to challenge plaintiffs' specific damage
amounts because of a plaintiff's ability to recover more than pleaded. 10
II. Removal Standards of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits
A. Kliebert Articulates the "Legal Certainty" Standard
In Kliebert v. Upjohn Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit considered the propriety ofjurisdiction over a case removed from
Louisiana state court in which the plaintiff sought specific damages less than
104. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(c).
105. 14C WRIGHT ETAL., supra note 1, § 3725, at 96.
106. Gafford v. General Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 157-58 (6th Cir. 1993).
107. SeeDeAguilar1,47F.3d 1404, 1410 (5th Cir. 1995) (arguing thatpotential plaintiff
manipulation of damages to stay in state court calls for reexamination of St. Paul Mercury);
Noble-Allgire, supra note 99, at 691-92 (stating that because of state versions of Rule 54(c),
"the defendant's exposure may in fact be much greater than the federal jurisdictional cut-off').
108. See 14C WRiGHTETAL., supra note 1, § 3725, at 98 ("The better practice is to treat
the amount requested by the plaintiff in the state court as the amount in controversy.").
109. See 14C id. (discussing effect on removal of state rules tracking Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(c)).
110. See De Aguilar 1, 47 F.3d at 1410 (observing that new pleading rules potentially
permit "abusive manipulation by plaintiffs"); Bums v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1096
n.6 (I Ith Cir. 1994) (declining to follow St. Paul Mercury's "absolute standard" because that
case was decided under different pleading rules).
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the jurisdictional amount.' Applicable Louisiana law did not preclude
plaintiffs from recovering judgments larger than originally sought in specifi-
cally pleaded ad damnums."' Although the Fifth Circuit subsequently agreed
to rehear the case en banc,"' after which the parties settled and dismissed the
appeal," 4 an examination of the case forms the basis for further analysis of
both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits' opinions. In effect, Kliebert provides a
bridge from the St. Paul Mercury decision to this Note's discussion of what
burden a defendant should bear when attempting to remove a case to federal
court that is facially unremovable because the plaintiff seeks specified dam-
ages below the jurisdictional amount.
In Kliebert, the plaintiff, Michael Anthony Kliebert, brought a products
liability suit in Louisiana state court against five pharmaceutical companies
that he alleged had manufactured and marketed certain tetracycline drugs. 5
Kliebert claimed that he had ingested the drugs as a child and that the drugs
had discolored his permanentteeth. 16 He sought exactly $10,000 in damages,
which was the federal jurisdictional amount of the time."7
The defendants removed the case to federal district court and contended
that the plaintiff had not pleaded damages in good faith but had artfully
concealed the actual amount in controversy in order to stay in state court."'
Kliebert filed a motion to remand but later withdrew the motion." 9 The
original federal district courtjudge had transferred Kliebert's case to a district
court judge who previously had rejected remand motions in two similar
actions that Kliebert's sister and her husband had instigated. 2 The district
court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment because
Kliebert's childhood physician could not testify to having prescribed any
particular tetracycline drug for Kliebert."' Kliebert timely appealed to the
Fifth Circuit and argued that the district court did not have removal jurisdic-
tion and that the court wrongly granted summary judgment for the defen-
111. See Kliebertv. Upjohn Co., 915 F.2d 142,144(5th Cir. 1990) (considering challenge
to removal jurisdiction), vacatedfor reh'g en banc, 923 F.2d 47 (5th Cir.), appeal dism 'dper
stipulation of settlement, 947 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1991).
112. Id. at 147.
113. Kliebert v. Upjohn Co., 923 F.2d 47,47 (5th Cir.), appeal dism 'dper stipulation of
settlement, 947 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1991).
114. Kliebert v. Upjohn Co., 947 F.2d 736, 737 (5th Cir. 1991).
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dants.' The Fifth Circuit failed to reach Kliebert's second issue because it
found that the district court lacked jurisdiction and remanded the case to state
court.'2
The Kliebert court began its consideration of removal jurisdiction by
establishing that because the district court had enteredjudgment, the issue was
not whether the case was properly removed, but whether the federal court
would have had original jurisdiction had the plaintiff originally filed there.124
The court then observed that the general federal rule is to determine the
amount in controversy from the damages requested in the complaint, unless
the plaintiff does not claim the amount in good faith."2 The Kliebert court
construed the St. Paul Mercury decision as concluding that a court must find
lack of good faith if it appears to a legal certainty that the claim is below the
jurisdictional amount.126 Thus, the court found that to apply the St. Paul
Mercury rule to cases in which the defendants removed a state court action
originally seeking damages below the federal jurisdictional amount, the
defendant has the burden of proving that the plaintiff underestimated the claim
in bad faith. 27
The Kiebert court then defined a removing defendant's burden. 128 The
court observed that several district courts had adopted a "reverse legal
certainty standard in cases with unspecified damages.'29 Under that standard,
a removing defendant has the burden of proving that it does not appear to
122. Id
123. Id at 147.
124. Id at 145. The court stated:
[W]here after removal a case is tried on the merits without objection and the federal
court enters judgment, the issue in subsequent proceedings on appeal is not whether
the case was properly removed, but whether the federal district court would have
had original jurisdiction of the case had it been filed in that court.
Id (quoting Grubbs v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 702 (1972)). The Ninth
Circuit recently stated that courts should not read the Grubbs decision to say that the St. Paul
Mercury "legal certainty" standard should apply in all removal cases. See Sanchez v. Monu-
mental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying "preponderance of the
evidence" standard to removing defendant in case with unspecified damages). Rather, once a
district court rules on a case's merits because the plaintiff failed to properly contest removal,
the plaintiffmay not attack the removalprocedures on appeal. Id. Still, the removing defendant
bears the burden of establishing original federal jurisdiction if the plaintiff challenges subject
matter jurisdiction on appeal. I
125. Kliebertv. Upjohn Co., 915 F.2d 142, 145 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting Horton v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 353 (1961)), vacated for reh'g en banc, 923 F.2d 47 (5th Cir.),
appeal dism'dper stipulation ofsettlement, 947 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1991).
126. Id
127. Id at 146.
128. Id.
129. See id. (examining district court cases adopting "reverse legal certainty" standard).
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a legal certainty that the claim is for less than the jurisdictional amount. 3 '
In essence, the defendant must show that there is a probability that the
amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum.' The court con-
cluded that a defendant's showing that the plaintiff possibly would recover
more than the jurisdictional amount is insufficient to establish the plaintiff's
bad faith.3 2 The court held that to establish a plaintiff's bad faith understate-
ment of his claim, a defendant must show that a successful plaintiff would
recover at least the jurisdictional minimum.' Under that standard, a trial
court must look to the pleadings, or possibly summary judgment-type evi-
dence, and conclude that it would have to grant a new trial if a jury awarded
less than the jurisdictional amount. 4 In other words, a removing defendant
must show to a legal certainty that the plaintiff's claim exceeds the jurisdic-
tional amount.'
The Kliebert court observed that under its "legal certainty" standard, the
St. Paul Mercury decision still applies to cases arising in states that confine
a plaintiff's judgment to the ad damnum clause. 6 Consequently, in those
states, a plaintiff could ensure a state court forum with a jurisdictionally
insufficient claim.'37 Louisiana did not so limit judgments, and the court
looked beyond Kliebert's complaint to ascertain the amount in controversy. 3'
The defendants cited other tetracycline cases in which judgments ranged from
$65,000 to $110,000.'9 However, the court observed that tetracycline discol-
oration varied. 40 The court determined that the defendants had not produced
130. Id.
131. See id (examining district court cases simplifying "reverse legal certainty" standard
to "a probability" standard). A plaintiffs claim is not legally certain to be less than the
jurisdictional amount if there is a probability that the claim exceeds the jurisdictional amount
See Corwin Jeep Sales & Serv., Inc. v. American Motors Sales Corp., 670 F. Supp. 591, 595
(M.D. Pa. 1986) (citing Cunningham v. Ford Motor Co., 413 F. Supp. 1101, 1103 (D.S.C.
1976)).
132. Kliebertv. Upjohn Co., 915 F.2d 142, 146(5th Cir. 1990), vacatedforreh'gen banc,
923 F.2d 47 (5th Cir.), appeal dism 'dper stipulation of settlement, 947 F.2d 736 (5th Cir.
1991).
133. Id
134. See id ("Under this standard, the trial court must be able to conclude from the
pleadings or, at the most, summary judgment-type evidence, that if a jury awarded less than
$10,000, the court would be required to grant a new trial.").
135. Id. at 147; see Bums v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095-96 (1lth Cir. 1994)
(characterizing Kliebert standard as "legal certainty" standard).
136. Kliebert, 915 F.2d at 146-47.
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evidence of the severity of discoloration of Kliebert's teeth in comparison to
the discoloration in the cited cases and thus could not establish that the
amount in controversy here was between $65,000 and $110,000.41 Thus, the
defendants failed to carry their "legal certainty" burden.'
Circuit Judge E. Grady Jolly wrote a vigorous dissent in Kliebert in
which he argued that the new "legal certainty" standard allows plaintiffs
unscrupulously to manipulate jurisdiction.' He first asserted that the same
standard of review should apply to the plaintiff's claim regardless of which
party seeks a federal forum.'" He further observed that a plaintiff filing
originally in federal court could, underSt. PaulMercury, maintainjurisdiction
by showing that the claim probably exceeds the federal jurisdictional
amount. 145 The equivalent burden for a defendant seeking removal to federal
court, he argued, would be one rejected by the majority: the defendant must
show only that a probability exists that the claim exceeds the jurisdictional
amount." The dissent downplayed the importance that the majority gave to
the plaintiff's choice of forum.1 7 The dissent said:
Although there may be valid reasons for a plaintiff choosing a state forum,
which are independent of the amount of the claim, such valid reasons (e.g.,
allowable discovery, evidentiary questions, and jury or judge characteris-
tics) cannot constitute good faith as to the allegation of jurisdictional
amount when the jurisdictional question, and hence the specific good faith
question, focuses only on whether the amount alleged forecloses jurisdic-
tion; in other words, the question of bad faith for the purposes ofjurisdic-
tion is whether the amount of the claim alleged in the state court complaint
is "colored" to avoid federal jurisdiction, for whatever reason. 48
141. Id
142. Id
143. Id at 148 (Jolly, J., dissenting).
144. See id. at 147 (Jolly, J., dissenting) ("No matter which party brings it into court, the
controversy remains the same; it involves the same amount of money and is to be adjudicated
and determined under the same rules." (quoting Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348,
354 (1961))).
145. Id (Jolly, J., dissenting). If a defendant cannot show to a legal certainty that the
amount in controversy is jurisdictionally insufficient, then a plaintiff has avoided dismissal
because a probability exists that the claim isjurisdictionally sufficient. See Jeffries v. Silvercup
Bakers, Inc., 434 F.2d 310, 311-12 (7th Cir. 1970) (concluding that plaintiff must show only
"a probability" of recovering more than jurisdictional amount in order to stay in federal court).
146. Kliebert v. Upjohn Co., 915 F.2d 142, 147-48 (5th Cir. 1990) (Jolly, J., dissenting),
vacatedfor reh 'g en banc, 923 F.2d 47 (5th Cir.), appeal dism 'dper stipulation ofsettlement,
947 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1991); see Noble-Allgire, supra note 99, at 728 (making same argu-
ment).
147. Kliebert, 915 F.2d at 148 (Jolly, J., dissenting).
148. Id (Jolly, J., dissenting).
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The dissent sought to place plaintiffs and defendants on equal footing con-
cerning choice of forum and in effect proposed giving choice of forum no role
in jurisdictional analysis.
149
Neither the Kliebert majority nor the dissent was prepared to find the St.
Paul Mercury decision inapplicable when a plaintiff challenges jurisdiction
after a defendant removes from a state court system that does not limit dam-
ages to those pleaded. 50 Rather, both recognized that a plaintiff's complaint
would not control the question ofjurisdiction if made in bad faith."' Their
disagreement arose over the severity of a removing defendant's burden when
the defendant attempts to show that a plaintiff has filed a bad faith complaint
in order to stay in state court.
52
B. Burns Adopts Kliebert's "Legal Certainty" Standard
Four years later, in Burns v. Windsor Insurance Co., the Eleventh Circuit
utilized the "legal certainty" approach that the Fifth Circuit recognized but
never established as precedent because it vacated the Kliebert opinion and
then dismissed the appeal.' Burns began in Alabama state court where
Jacqueline Burns sued Windsor Insurance Company for fraud, breach of
contract, bad faith failure to pay an insurance claim, and negligence arising
from a coverage dispute.5 4 Burns sought no more than $45,000 damages,
$5000 below the jurisdictional amount at the time.155 Windsor removed based
on diversity, and Bums sought remand. 56  Windsor claimed that Bums
was trying to manipulate jurisdiction.'57 The district court denied Burns's
149. See id. at 149 (Jolly, J., dissenting) ("I would think, that choice of forum should not
play even an indirect determining role in the jurisdictional analysis.").
150. See supra notes 125-27, 144-45 and accompanying text (discussing Kliebert major-
ity's and dissent's uses of reasoning from St. Paul Mercury).
151. See supra notes 125-26, 147-48 and accompanying text (discussing Kliebert major-
ity's and dissent's considerations of bad faith complaints).
152. See supra notes 143-49 and accompanying text (discussing Kliebert dissent's point
of disagreement with majority).
153. See Burnsv. WindsorIns. Co., 31 F.3d 1092,1095-96 &n.7 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding
Kliebert court's reasoning "instructive" although case has no precedential value).
154. Id at 1093-94.
155. Id at 1094.
156. Id.
157. Id. Windsor worried that because 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) absolutely limits to one year
the time during which a defendant can remove, Bums could walt a year and amend her com-
plaint to seek damages above the jurisdictional amount. Id. at 1094 n.4. In that case, Windsor
could not remove. Id. The court, however, dismissed Windsor's argument in a footnote. Id
The court stated that congressional action, not judicial action, should remedy the potential for
manipulation. Id.
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motion to remand when Burns refused to agree never to seek more than
$49,999.15 After the court entered summary judgment for Windsor, Bums
appealed. 59
The Eleventh Circuit began its opinion by finding that the case differed
from the typical diversity case in which the plaintiff originally seeks damages
above the jurisdictional amount in federal court.)" The court also found that
the case was not a typical removal case in which the plaintiff begins in state
court seeking more than the jurisdictional amount.161 The court then recog-
nized that a plaintiff still controls the claim.162 In this case, the face of the
plaintiff's complaint demanding only $45,000 did not confer jurisdiction on
the district court. 63 However, the court did not end its inquiry with that
determination.
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the conclusion of both Iowa Central and
St. Paul Mercury that a defendant, as a matter of law, cannot remove a case
in which a plaintiff seeks less than the jurisdictional amount.' The court
then attempted to define the burden that a defendant must meet to prove
jurisdiction in the face of a plaintiff's jurisdictionally insufficient claim .
6
The court relied on the ethical obligations of counsel in stating that a plain-
tiff's specific claim in a pleading signed by a lawyer deserves a presumption
of truth." Therefore, the defendant's burden must be heavy, and further, a
strict standard comports with case law and Congress's policy of limiting
diversity jurisdiction' 67 The court concluded that to avoid a remand a defen-
dant must prove to a legal certainty that plaintiff's counsel has falsely or
incompetently valued the claim. 6 Thus, the "defendant must prove to a legal
certainty that plaintiff's claim must exceed [the jurisdictional amount]." 69
While the Eleventh Circuit agreed with much of Kliebert's reasoning,
it stressed that the "legal certainty" standard is objective.' The subjective
158. Id. at 1094.
159. Id. at 1094 n.3.
160. Id. at 1094.
161. Id
162. Id. at 1095.
163. Id
164. Id at 1096 n.6.
165. See id. at 1095 ("[The critical question is to what extent must defendant provejuris-
diction exists despite plaintiff's express claim to less than the minimum jurisdictional sum.").
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1095-96.
168. Id. at 1095.
169. Id
170. Id at 1096.
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intent of the plaintiff or plaintiffs counsel is irrelevant.17' However, the court
declined to follow Kliebert to the extent that the earlier decision holds that the
defendant must always prove the plaintiffs bad faith to prevail." The
Kliebert court had adhered to the St. Paul Mercury decision by allowing a
plaintiff s good faith demand to control jurisdiction but allowing a defendant
to maintain federal jurisdiction by showing bad faith pleading." The Burns
court took a further step. By declining to follow St. Paul Mercury, the court,
in essence, found that modem procedural rules which do not limit damages
superseded St. Paul Mercury.'7 Thus, a defendant may freely challenge the
jurisdiction-limiting aspect of a plaintiffs specific demand for damages, but
a defendant must bear the heavy "legal certainty" burden. 75 The court found
that the rule proposed by Windsor- a "reverse legal certainty" rule that would
allow federal jurisdiction if the plaintiff could possibly recover more than the
jurisdictional amount - would unacceptably expand removal jurisdiction
based on diversity. 76
The Burns court went on to find that Windsor had not met its heavy
burden.'77 Windsor had made only conclusory allegations and offered no
proof that Bums had grossly undervalued her claim.' The court of appeals
vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case to Alabama state
court.'79 The Eleventh Circuit had allowed Windsor to challenge Bums's
specific damages, and Windsor failed to show to a legal certainty that the
damages were jurisdictionally sufficient.' One year later, the Fifth Circuit
rejected the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit in Burns as well as that of its
earlier opinion in Kliebert and adopted the lighter "preponderance of the
evidence" burden for a removing defendant.'
171. Id
172. Id at 1096 n.10.
173. See infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text (discussing Kliebert court's incorpora-
tion of reasoning of St. Paul Mercury decision).
174. See Bums v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1096 n.6 (1lth Cir. 1994) (declining
to follow St. PaulMercury and Iowa Central "because these cases were decided when different
rules about pleading damages (in general, much more strict) and about jurisdiction were in
effect").
175. Id. at 1095.
176. Id at 1096-97.




181. See infra Part IH.C (discussing DeAguilar 11, 47 F.3d 1404 (5th Cir. 1995)).
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C. De Aguilar II Adopts the "Preponderance of the Evidence" Standard
In De Aguilar v. Boeing Co. (De Aguilar II), the Fifth Circuit again
confronted the question raised in Kliebert: What burden should a removing
defendant meet to show that the requisite amount truly is in controversy when
the plaintiff specifically pleads damages below the federal jurisdictional
amount?' This time though, the court found that an equitable standard
would require a defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that
the amount in controversy actually exceeds the jurisdictional amount."3 The
Fifth Circuit stated that its past decisions had favored parties seeking federal
jurisdiction. 4 The court then found that the "preponderance ofthe evidence"
standard seemed more congruent with that philosophy than did the stricter
standard of Kliebert."'
The tortuous procedural path of the case ultimately decided inDeAguilar
11 began on March 31, 1986, when a Mexicana Airlines jet crashed near
Mexico City killing everyone on board.1 6 Relatives and personal representa-
tives of the estates of the victims unsuccessfully sought aUnited States forum
for lawsuits at several venues in Illinois, Texas, and Washington." 7 In one of
those cases, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
dismissed the plaintiffs' claims on forum non conveniens grounds.' The
plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit arguing that the district court should
have applied state law and that under Texas common law the doctrine of
forum non conveniens did not apply to their wrongful death action.'89 In De
Aguilar v. Boeing Co. (DeAguilarl),' the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
182. See DeAguilar l, 47 F.3d 1404, 1408 (5th Cir. 1995) (regarding plaintiff's claim as
one for specific, jurisdictionally insufficient amount and seeking to determine defendant's
burden for establishing federal jurisdiction).
183. Id at 1412.
184. Id at 1411 (citing Kliebertv. Upjohn Co., 915 F.2d 142, 145 (5th Cir. 1990) (Jolly,
J., dissenting), vacatedfor reh 'gen bane, 923 F.2d 47 (5th Cir.), appeal dism 'dper stipulation
of settlement, 947 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1991)).
185. Id. at 1411-12.
186. Id at 1406.
187. See id at 1406-07 & n.1 (listing earlier cases in which parties voluntarily dismissed
actions or courts dismissed actions on basis of foreign sovereign immunity or forum non
conveniens).
188. See De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 806 F. Supp. 139, 145 (E.D. Tex. 1992) (applying
federal law of forum non conveniens and dismissing plaintiffs' claims), aff'd, 11 F.3d 55 (5th
Cir. 1995).
189. See De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., I1 F.3d 55, 56 (5th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter De Agui-
lar 1] (discussing plaintiffs' basis for appeal to court of appeals).
190. 11 F.3d 55 (5th Cir. 1993).
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court's application of federal forum non conveniens law to a motion to dis-
miss a diversity action to a foreign forum.1 9'
Undeterred, several heirs of the decedents again filed suit in Texas state
court and, in contravention of Texas procedural rules, specified damages
below the federal jurisdictional amount in an effort to prevent removal.' 92 The
defendants, including Boeing, Delta Airlines, B.F. Goodrich, and Goodyear
Tire and Rubber, again removed to federal court in the Eastern District of
Texas arguing that the plaintiffs did not have the authority to limit damages.193
When the plaintiffs moved to remand, they provided the district court with an
affidavit from one of their attorneys swearing that she had explicit authority
from each of the named plaintiffs to limit damages. 94 The district court
denied the motion to remand and granted the defendants' subsequent motion
to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds. 95 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
observed that in De Aguilar lit had affirmed the district court's dismissal on
forum non conveniens grounds.'96 Therefore, if the court were to find federal
jurisdiction in De Aguilar 11, the forum non conveniens dismissal would be
the law of the case. 197
The De Aguilar I court began its jurisdictional inquiry by determining
that it would regard the plaintiffs' complaint as one for a specific amount of
damages below the jurisdictional amount although the plaintiffs simply had
said that they were seeking less than $50,000.198 The court then examined St.
191. See DeAguilarI, 11 F.3d 55, 58 (5th Cir. 1993) (confirming that federal, not Texas,
law applied in resolving forum non conveniens issue). In De Aguilar I, the Fifth Circuit
established that when a plaintiff does not specify damages, the removing defendant must prove
thejurisdictional amount by apreponderance ofthe evidence. I Relatives and representatives
of estates of victims of a 1986 Mexicana Airlines crash brought a wrongful death action in
Texas state court against the airplane manufacturer, among others. Id. at56-57. The defendants
removed to federal district court, and the court dismissed the action on forum non conveniens
grounds. Id. at 57. On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the court found that the complaint, although
for unspecified damages, on its face sought damages exceeding the jurisdictional amount
because it sought damages for wrongful death. Id. Further, the court found that the defendants
easily had met their burden of proof by showing that the plaintiffs had sought up to $5 million
in other venues. Id at 58. The court of appeals also found that the district court did not err in
applying federal law of forum non conveniens and agreed with the district court that Mexico
would be a more convenient forum. Id at 58-59. Consequently, the district court had jurisdic-
tion over the case and its disposition was proper. Id. at 59.
192. De Aguilar 1, 47 F.3d 1404, 1407 (5th Cir. 1995).
193. Id.
194. Id at 1408.
195. Id
196. Id at 1408 n.3.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 1408. ("As a functional matter, plaintiffs are attempting to avoid federal
jurisdiction."). The court stated that by treating the plaintiffs' complaint as demanding a
PLEADING TO STA YIN STATE COURT
Paul Mercury and found that its legal certainty test only applied to typical
diversity and typical removal situations.'" De Aguilar 11 was not a typical
case because the plaintiffs, "in a bold effort to avoid federal court," pleaded
jurisdictionally insufficient damages.2' The court still found St. Paul Mer-
cury instructional, however, and concluded that a plaintiff's bad faith pleading
will not control jurisdiction.2"' The court further observed that state proce-
dural rules that do not limit damage awards to the amount pleaded in the ad
damnum open the door for plaintiffs to manipulate pleadings to stay in state
court yet ultimately recover more than thejurisdictional amount.2"2 The court
stated that "[s]uch manipulation is surely characterized as bad faith."20 a To
avoid plaintiff manipulation, the De Aguilar 11 court held that if a defendant
can show that the amount in controversy actually is jurisdictionally sufficient,
then to justify remand, a plaintiff must show to a legal certainty that recovery
is limited to requested damages.2
The DeAguilar 1I court then attempted to define a removing defendant's
particular burden. °0 The court examined the Kliebert "legal certainty"
standard and determined that the standard was too strict.2" Additionally, the
court found the "some possibility" and "reverse legal certainty" standards to
be too permissive.20 7 The court stated that to some extent the plaintiff is still
the master of the complaint.2 5 Accordingly, the court adopted an intermediate
approach.2" "[T]he plaintiff's claim remains presumptively correct unless the
defendant can show by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in
controversy is greater than the jurisdictional amount."21 The court stated that
specific amount, the court rendered inapposite prior decisions in which plaintiffs did not specify
damages. Id. at 1048 & n.4. At the time, the federal jurisdictional amount for diversity cases
was $50,000. Id at 1406.
199. Id. at 1409.
200. Id. at 1409-10.
201. Id. at 1410.
202. See id. ("The majority of states now.., have followed the example of FED.RCIV.P.
54(c) and do not limit damage awards to the amount specified in the addamnum clause of the
state pleading."). The court also observed that Texas and many other states had enacted rules
which prohibit plaintiffs from pleading specific amounts in cases in which damages are un-
liquidated. Id.
203. Id.




208. Id. at 1411-12.
209. Id. at 1412.
210. Id.
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a defendant, however, must do more than point out that state law might allow
the plaintiff to manipulate the complaint.2 '
The Fifth Circuit explained that once a defendant has removed a case by
meeting its preponderance of the evidence burden, the case becomes analo-
gous to St. Paul Mercwy."1 Consequently, the federal court will retain
jurisdiction unless the plaintiff can show to a legal certainty that the jurisdic-
tional amount is not in controversy.213 The court speculated that a plaintiff's
state complaint might cite state law limiting damages to the pleaded amount
and prohibiting amendments increasing the ad damnum.1 4 In states without
these statutes, the plaintiffimust file a binding stipulation or affidavit with the
complaint." 5 The court stated that stipulations after removal do not affect
jurisdiction according to St. Paul Mercury.
216
The De Aguilar II court observed that the De Aguilar Icourt already had
determined that the amount in controversy exceeded the federal jurisdictional
amount.21 7 The court also found that Texas law, not Mexico law, should apply
to the case, and, therefore, the plaintiffs had not shown that they could legally
limit their respective damages to below $50,000.28 Consequently, the district
court had jurisdiction, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's dis-
missal of the case.219
By finding federal jurisdiction in DeAguilar II, the Fifth Circuit cleanly
disposed of the case because its prior dismissal on forum non conveniens
grounds in De Aguilar I controlled the case as long as that federal decision
could apply.' Whether the Fifth Circuit favored federal jurisdiction because
of the unique procedural history of the case is a matter of speculation. How-








218. See id. at 1413-15 (discussing plaintiffs' claim that Mexican law should apply
allowing plaintiffs legally to limit their respective claims to below jurisdictional amount as
lawful heirs of decedents). The plaintiffs sought a Texas state forum because forum non
conveniens would not apply, but they wanted to apply Mexican law in getting there. Id. at
1413. The Fifth Circuit concluded that Texas law should apply and that under Texas law, the
plaintiffs had not alleged the necessary elements to be considered legal heirs. Id. at 1414-15.
Withoutproving thatthey were legal heirs, the plaintiffs had no authority to limittheir damages.
Id at 1415.
219. Id.
220. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text (discussing disposition of case in De
Aguilar II if court found federal jurisdiction).
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did the Eleventh Circuit, and the Fifth Circuit appears to have drawn that
lighter standard from cases that materially differed from De Aguilar 1I.'
Early in its De Aguilar II opinion, the Fifth Circuit stated that it would
treat the plaintiffs' claim as one for a specific amount of damages below the
jurisdictional amount.' Thus, the court rendered inapposite earlier decisions
in cases in which plaintiffs claimed unspecified damages. 4 However, when
the court established a burden for a defendant seeking to remove an action
with specific, jurisdictionally insufficient damages, the court looked to De
Aguilar I- a case in which the plaintiffs did not specify damages - for the
"preponderance of the evidence" burden.' The court in De Aguilar I had
adopted the standard that the Ninth Circuit and the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan articulated in cases dealing with
unspecified damages. 6 Those courts in turn had looked to a 1936 United
States Supreme Court case - again, one with unspecified damages - for the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard. 7 Consequently, the De Aguilar
11 court, after distinguishing its case from decisions concerning unspecified
damages, rendered that distinction meaningless.2" Should a defendant wish
to remove a case filed in state court within the Fifth Circuit, the burden to
establish the requisite amount in controversy is the same whether the plaintiff
claims unspecified damages or claims a specific amount below the jurisdic-
tional amount. 9
221. See De Aguilar 1, 47 F.3d 1404, 1411 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding "legal certainty"
burden too strict).
222. See infra notes 223-29 and accompanying text (discussingDeAguilarlls derivation
of "preponderance of the evidence" standard).
223. De Aguilar 11, 47 F.3d at 1408.
224. Id at 1408 & n.4.
225. Id at 1411.
226. See De Aguilar I, 11 F.3d 55, 58 (5th Cir. 1993) (adopting "preponderance of the
evidence" standard of Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1992), and Garza v.
Beitcher Industries, Inc., 752 F. Supp. 753, 763 (E.D. Mich. 1990), in case with unspecified
damages).
227. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1992) (adopting standard of
McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936), in case with unspeci-
fied damages); Garzav. BettcherIndus., Inc., 752 F. Supp. 753,763 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (same).
228. See supra notes 223-27 and accompanying text (discussing DeAguilar IIcourt's use
of standard from inapposite cases).
229. Compare De Aguilar I, 11 F.3d at 58 (stating that "preponderance of the evidence"
burden applies in cases with unspecified damages) with DeAguilar 1, 47 F.3d 1404, 1411 (5th
Cir. 1995) (stating that same test applies when plaintiff pleads specific amount of damages).
In 1995, the Fifth Circuit in Allen v. R&H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326 (5th Cir. 1995),
returned to the question of the burden of proof for a removing defendant when a plaintiff does
not specify damages. Id. at 1335. Although the court insisted that the "plaintiff remains the
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IV. Choosing the Proper Standard
A. The "Reverse Legal Certainty" Standard and Expanding
Federal Jurisdiction
Between the Kliebert dissent and the majority opinions of De Aguilar II
and Burns, three distinct burdens for removing defendants to establish the
amount in controversy - "reverse legal certainty," "preponderance of the
evidence," and "legal certainty" - found advocates. The Kliebert dissent
argued that the "reverse legal certainty" standard, the most lenient of the three,
is appropriate because it imposes the same burden on a removing defendant
as the St. Paul Mercury "legal certainty" burden places on a plaintiff who
originally files in federal court."0 The Burns court rejected this rationale and
stated that a plaintiff's choice of forum deserves more deference than a defen-
dant's right to remove. 1 On that point the De Aguilar 11 court agreed with
the Burns opinion. 2 The De Aguilar 1I court found that a test which merely
requires a removing defendant to show that a plaintiffcouldrecover more than
the jurisdictional amount is too permissive. 3 Both the Sixth Circuit? 4 and
the Ninth Circuit? 5 have agreed that adoption of the "reverse legal certainty"
or "some possibility" standard, even in cases with unspecified damages, will
unreasonably expand federal diversity jurisdiction. If the "reverse legal
certainty" standard is inapplicable when damages are indeterminate on the
master of his complaint," the court stated that DeAguilar1Ps "preponderance of the evidence"
standard applies when a plaintiff specifies damages. Id. at 1335 & n.14. The court, citing De
Aguilar 1, then reaffirmed its adoption of the "preponderance of the evidence" standard when
a plaintiff does not specify damages. Id. at 1335.
230. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text (discussing Kliebert dissent's
argument for equality of burdens on removing defendants and plaintiffs filing in federal court);
see also Noble-Allgire, supra note 99, at 728 (arguing that removing defendants and plaintiffs
filing in federal court should bear same burden of showing that it is not legally and factually
impossible for plaintiff to recover more than jurisdictional amount).
231. See Bums v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (1 th Cir. 1994) ("Defendant's
right to remove and plaintiff's right to choose his forum are not on equal footing; for example,
unlike the rules applied when plaintiff has filed suit in federal court with a claim that, on its
face, satisfies the jurisdictional amount, removal statutes are construed narrowly. .. ").
232. See De Aguilar II, 47 F.3d at 1411 (citing Burns for proposition that "reverse legal
certainty" test is unduly light burden for removing defendant).
233. Id.;see 14C WRIGHTETAL.,supra note 1, § 3725, at 91-92 ("The most lenientburden
... requires the defendant merely to show that it does not appear to a legal certainty that the
amount in controversy falls below the applicable jurisdictional amount." (footnote omitted)).
234. See Gafford v. General Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 158-59 (6th Cir. 1993) (discussing
standards for removal in light of limited nature of federal jurisdiction).
235. See Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 403 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating
that "reverse legal certainty" test "may result in an unwarranted expansion of federal diversity
jurisdiction").
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face of the complaint, the standard should apply afortiori when a plaintiff
specifies damages. A plaintiff seeking specific damages below the jurisdic-
tional amount in state court not only evinces a desire for a state forum, but the
plaintiff's claim is presumptively correct unless made in bad faith. 6 A
defendant who can show that a prevailing plaintiff possibly could recover
more than the jurisdictional amount still falls far short of showing that the
plaintiff has manipulated the complaint in a bad faith attempt to remain in
state court and yet ultimately recover more than the jurisdictional amount.
B. The "Preponderance of the Evidence" Standard and
Unspecified Damages
Although the "reverse legal certainty" standard may be too permissive
even when damages are unspecified, several courts of appeals agree that in
these cases the defendant's burden should be lighter than if the plaintiffpleads
specificjurisdictionally insufficient damages. 7 Courts adopting the "prepon-
derance of the evidence" burden for defendants removing cases with unspeci-
fied damages generally acknowledge that the standard strikes the proper
balance between a plaintiff s right to choose the forum and the defendant's
236. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938) (stating
that sum claimed by plaintiff controlsjurisdiction if made in good faith). In Kliebert, the court
allowed the removing defendants to challenge the plaintiff's good faith in making his damages
claim rather than preventing the defendants' removal as amatter of law. See supra notes 125-27
and accompanying text (examining how Kltebert decision adapted St. Paul Mercury decision
to allow defendants to challenge plaintiff's jurisdictionally insufficient claim). In Burns, the
court agreed that ajurisdictionally insufficient claim does not bar removal as a matter of law
because rules governing pleading and recovery are now less strict than when the Supreme Court
decidedlowa Central and St. PaulMercury. See Burns, 31 F.3d at 1096 n.6 (explaining court's
unwillingness strictly to adhere to Iowa Central and St. Paul Mercury decisions). "But, these
cases do support the fundamental principle that plaintiff is the master of his own claim." Id.
The Burns court, however, went further than the Kliebert court and allowed a removing
defendant to challenge not only a plaintiff's good faith but also the claim itself, albeit with a
heavy burden of proof. Id. at 1096 & n.10. The DeAguilar H court more closely adhered to
the rationale of Kliebert on this point and determined that a plaintiff's manipulating the
complaint to stay in state court but recovering more than the jurisdictional amount "is surely
characterized as bad faith." De Aguilar 11, 47 F.3d 1404, 1410 (5th Cir. 1995). Consequently,
the De Aguilar I court allowed the removing defendants the opportunity to show that the
amount in controversy actually exceeded the jurisdictional amount. Id. at 1411.
237. See Sanchez, 102 F.3d at 403 (determining that "preponderance of the evidence"
burden strikes proper balance between interests of plaintiffs and defendants when plaintiff does
not specify damages); Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1356-57 (1Ith Cir.
1996) ("Where a plaintiff has made an unspecified demand for damages, a lower burden of
proof is warranted because there is simply no estimate of damages to which a court may defer.");
Gafford, 997 F.2d at 160 (stating that in cases in which plaintiff does not specify damages,
plaintiff's claim cannot determine amount in controversy and strict "legal certainty" test should
not apply).
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right to remove." Not coincidentally, commentators have praised DeAguilar
IPs adoption of the "preponderance of the evidence" standard as finding an
equitable balance between these competing interests. 2 9  Further, federal
district courts have cited De Aguilar !1 when applying the "preponderance of
the evidence" standard to cases with unspecified damages.2 °
However, the De Aguilar II court adopted the "preponderance of the
evidence" standard for cases with specific jurisdictionally insufficient dam-
ages.24 The De Aguilar II court found its rationale for adopting the "prepon-
derance of the evidence" standard in prior Fifth Circuit opinions which
concluded that the standard for establishing jurisdiction should favor the party
seeking the federal forum.242 Further, the court cited a Fifth Circuit opinion
which stated that plaintiffs should not be able to destroy the jurisdictional
choice that Congress gave defendants through the removal statute.243
By favoring removing defendants with a less strict standard, the Fifth
Circuit ignored the widely held beliefs that courts should construe the removal
statute narrowly and that courts should resolve doubts about jurisdiction in
favor ofremand.24 The United States Supreme Court in Shamrock Oil & Gas
238. See Tapscott, 77 F.3d at 1357 ("The proper balance between a plaintiff's right to
choose his forum and a defendant's right to remove, without unnecessarily expanding federal
diversity jurisdiction, is struck by a 'preponderance of the evidence' standard."); Gafford, 997
F.2d at 160 ("We believe that the mean between the extremes unsettles to the least extent the
balance struck between the defendant's right to remove and the federal interest in limiting
diversity jurisdiction.").
239. See Lawrence W. Moore, S.J., Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, 41 LOY. L. REv.
469,481 (1995) (stating that DeAguilarlis standard "seems a sensible and durable equilibrium
point on which to balance the parties' interests"); Urquhart, supra note 91, at 519 (stating that
standard of De Aguilar II is more equitable than Burns's standard).
240. See, e.g., Ace Pest Control Co. v. Kmart Corp., 979 F. Supp. 443, 445 (E.D. La.
1997) (citing DeAguilar I and adopting its "preponderance of the evidence" standard for case
with unspecified damages); Mercantev. Preston Trucking Co., No. CIV.A. 96-5904, 1997 WL
230826, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 1, 1997) (same); Duhon v. Conoco, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 1216, 1221
(W.D. La. 1996) (same); In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 918 F. Supp. 178,
180 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (same).
241. Seesupranote 198 and accompanying text (discussing DeAguilarIlcourt's treatment
of case as one for specific damages).
242. See De Aguilar II, 47 F.3d 1404, 1411 (5th Cir. 1995) ("As the dissenting judge
indicated in Kliebert, the strict test adopted by the Kliebert majority 'seems to conflict with our
past decisions that have stated that the standard for determining jurisdictional amount should
favor "those parties seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal district court."").
243. See id. ("This court has spoken adamantly of 'preventing the plaintifffrom being able
to destroy the jurisdictional choice that Congress intended to afford a defendant in the removal
statute."' (quoting Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 759 F.2d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1985))).
244. SeeKokkonenv. GuardianLifelns. Co. ofAm., 511 U.S. 375,377 (1994) (statingthat
federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, thus presumption is that causes lie outside
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Corp. v. Sheets24 insisted that congressional intent called for a strict construc-
tion of the removal statute.2' The Shamrock Court also emphasized that a
strong concern for the "rightful independence of state governments" should
guide federal courts when they consider jurisdiction questions.247 Several
federal district courts have advanced an additional rationale for preferring
remand: the unfairness of exposing a plaintiff to the possibility of obtaining
a final judgment in federal court only to have an appeals court determine that
the district court lacked jurisdiction to decide the case on its merits.248
Many federal courts of appeals have followed the reasoning of the Sham-
rock decision and have preferred remand over removal.2" For courts to con-
jurisdiction until proved otherwise); Turner v. Bank of North-America, 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 8, 11
(1799) (same); CHARLES ALANWRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 237 (4th ed. 1983) ("A great
many cases might be cited for the proposition that if federal jurisdiction is doubtful the case
should be remanded."); 14C WRIGHTETAL.,supra note 1, § 3739, at 446 n.28 (collecting cases).
245. 313 U.S. 100 (1941).
246. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941) (stating that
successive acts of Congress regulating federal jurisdiction indicate intent for strict construction
of removal statute). In Shamrock, the Court considered whether a diverse plaintiff facing a
jurisdictionally sufficient counterclaim could remove that state action to federal court. lal at
103. The Court concluded that the plaintiff could not remove. Ia at 108-09. The plaintiff
argued that removal was proper because the counterclaim in essence made it a defendant for the
purposes of the removal statute. Id. at 104. However, the Court focused on the meaning of the
statute rather than on a party's self-characterization. Id The Court concluded that Congress
intended a narrow interpretation of the removal statute. Id at 107-08. Thus, a plaintiff facing
a counterclaim was not a "defendant" within the meaning of the removal statute. Id. at 108.
The Court affirmed the court of appeals's remand of the case to state court. Id. at 109.
247. Id. at 108-09 (quoting Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263,270(1934)); see Healy v. Ratta,
292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934) ("Due regard for the rightful independence of state governments,
which should actuate federal courts, requires that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdic-
tion to the precise limits which the statute has defined."); see also Progressive Specialty Ins. Co.
v. Nobles, 928 F. Supp. 1096, 1099 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (discussing Shamrock court as relying
heavily on federalism concerns to construe strictly removal statutes); Auto Ins. Agency, Inc. v.
Interstate Agency, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 1104, 1106 (D.S.C. 1981) (stating that courts must con-
strue strictly federal removal statutes to keep federal judiciary within jurisdictional bounds);
Town of Freedom, Okla. v. Muskogee Bridge Co., 466 F. Supp. 75,77-78 (W.D. Okla. 1978)
(stating that removal statutes represent "encroachments by the federal courts into the various
states' sovereignties").
248. See Limbach Co. v. Renaissance Ctr. Partnership, 457 F. Supp. 347, 349 (W.D. Pa.
1978) (preferring remand because ofpotential unfairness to plaintiff); Rosack v. Volvo of Am.
Corp., 421 F. Supp. 933, 937 (N.D. Cal. 1976) ("[A]ny doubt should be resolved in favor of
remand to spare the parties proceedings which might later be nullified should jurisdiction be
found to be lacking."). But see Boatmen's Bank v. Fritzlen, 135 F. 650, 654 (8th Cir. 1905)
(arguing that federal courts should resolve doubts in favor of retaining jurisdiction because
dismissal or remand orders are not subject to review).
249. See, e.g., Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir.
1994) (citing Shamrock for proposition that "[b]ecause removal jurisdiction raises significant
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strue the removal statute strictly, as called for in Shamrock, they must construe
strictly the statutes granting originalj urisdiction to federal courts because only
cases qualifying for original federal jurisdiction may be removed from state
courts.2 ° Accordingly, courts that strictly construe the federal diversity
jurisdiction statute must strictly construe its amount in controversy require-
ment,"1 and such strict construction is consistent with Congress's use of the
jurisdictional amount in diversity cases to limit access to federal courts.22
C. Congressional Intent and the "Legal Certainty" Standard
Throughout the more than 200-year history of original and derivative
jurisdiction of lower federal courts, Congress has wielded the amount in con-
troversy requirement to limit access to those courts.23 At various times, three
rationales -judicial federalism, cost efficiency, and caseload constraints -
have dominated debates over the existence and amount of the jurisdictional
limit.254 All three rationales support restricting diversity jurisdiction s and,
thus, removal jurisdiction based on diversityY As Congress consistently has
federalism concerns, [courts] must strictly construe removal jurisdiction"); In re Business Men's
Assurance Co. of Am., 992 F.2d 181, 183 (8th Cir. 1993) ("The district court was required to
resolve all doubts about federal jurisdiction in favor of remand."); Boggs v. Lewis, 863 F.2d
662, 663 (9th Cir. 1988) ("This court strictly construes the removal statute against removal
jurisdiction."); Steel Valley Auth. v. Union Switch & Signal Div., 809 F.2d 1006,1010 (3d Cir.
1987) ("It is settled that the removal statutes are to be strictly construed against removal and all
doubts should be resolved in favor of remand." (footnote omitted)), cert. dismissed, 484 U.S.
1021 (1988).
250. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (discussing interaction of removal
statutes with statutes granting original jurisdiction to federal courts).
251. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing operation of two prongs of
federal diversity jurisdiction statute).
252. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938) (deter-
mining that courts have rigorously enforced intent of Congress drastically to restrict federal
jurisdiction in diversity cases).
253. See Baker, supra note 37, at 302 (discussing long history of congressional use of
amount in controversy requirement).
254. See generally id. at 302-18 (discussing policy rationales and debates concerning
federal amount in controversy requirement); Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis ofDiversiy
Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483 (1928) (same).
255. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGEPLAN FORTHE FED-
ERAL COuRTS 9-16, 21-23, 29-39 (1995) [hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN] (advocating restric-
tion, if not abolition, of diversityjurisdiction based on concerns ofjudicial federalism and over-
burdened federal courts); see also Baker, supra note 37, at 305-06 (determining that Congress
and federal courts historically have restricted access to federal courts to preserve autonomy of
state courts and, to lesser extent, because of cost efficiency and caseload constraints).
256. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (discussing how removal jurisdiction
over diversity case requires same elements as original diversity action).
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raised the amount in controversy requirement, 7 it has also consistently reaf-
firmed its belief in the jurisdictional amount as a tool to effect jurisdictional
goals."8 For example, Congress attempts to set the amount in controversy
requirement at a level that will extend federal jurisdiction to "substantial"
controversiesm 9 In 1958, the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that "[t]he
jurisdictional amount should not be so high as to convert the Federal courts
into courts of big business nor so low as to fritter away their time in the trial
of petty controversies.'2 In 1988, when Congress raised the jurisdictional
amount for diversity cases from $10,000 to $50,000, the House of'Representa-
tives cited the goals of reducing federal caseload and reflecting inflation to
justify the increase.26" ' In debating the 1996 increase to $75,000, the Senate
claimed to be balancing the interests of the federal judiciary in reducing its
increasing caseload with the interests of litigants using the federal courts.262
While Congress currently is unwilling to abolish diversity jurisdiction,263 it
257. Congress reduced the amount in controversy requirement only once, from $500 to
$400, in 1801. See Baker, supra note 37, at 305 (discussing short-lived "Law of the Midnight
Judges" Act of 1801).
258. See supra notes 254-257 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent
upon raising amount in controversy requirement).
259. See S. REP. No. 85-1830, at 3 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3101
(discussing proper level for jurisdictional amount).
260. Id
261. See H.R. REP.No. 100-889, at45 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982,6005
(discussing rationale for increasing jurisdictional amount). The House Report states that
proponents of diversity reform expected that increasing thejurisdictional amount from $10,000
to $50,000 should decrease the federal diversity caseload by up to 40%. H.R. REP. No. 100-
889, at 45, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6006.
262. See S. REP. No. 104-366, at 29 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4202,4209
(discussing raising jurisdictional amount). The Senate Judiciary Committee stated that "[tihe
adjustment ofthejurisdictional amount [from $50,000 to $75,000] provides claims with substan-
tial amounts at issue access to a Federal forum, if diversity of citizenship among parties exists."
S. REP. No. 104-366, at 29-30, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4209 (emphasis added).
263. Some commentators argue for abolishing diversity jurisdiction altogether. See LONG
RANGEPLAN, supra note 255, at 31 (stating that Judicial Conference opposes diversity jurisdic-
tion). Since 1977, the Judicial Conference of the United States has advocated this step. Id.
Among others calling for the abolition of diversity jurisdiction is the Study Committee of the
Sub-Committee on Diversity Jurisdiction of the New York County Lawyers' Association. See
Sub-Committee on Diversity Jurisdiction, New York County Lawyers' Association, Report of
the New York County Lawyers' Association Committee on the Federal Courts on the Recom-
mendation ofthe Federal Courts Study Committee to AbolishDiversity Jurisdiction, 158 F.R.D.
185, 189-93 (1990) (discussing abolition of diversity jurisdiction). As early as 1928, Henry J.
Friendly, in an oft-cited article on the history of diversity jurisdiction, questioned whether
diversity jurisdiction should yield to increasing federal question litigation. Friendly, supra note
254, at 510. Friendly downplayed the fear of local hostility to nonresident defendants and
stated that diversity cases "intrinsically belong[ ] to the state courts." Id
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clearly and consistently expresses the idea that diversity cases involving less
than the jurisdictional amount belong in state courts.2'
Additionally, Congress has statutorily restrained plaintiffs from manufac-
turing diversity jurisdiction,265 but it has made no meaningful effort to ban the
practice of defeating jurisdiction by pleading jurisdictionally insufficient
damages.2' Some commentators, moreover, argue that there is no policy
against defeating federal diversity jurisdiction.267 A plaintiff's manufacturing
federal jurisdiction is qualitatively different from manipulation designed to
defeat it.26 By manufacturing diversity jurisdiction, a plaintiff calls on an
overburdened federal court to adjudicate a case that, except for the juris-
diction-invoking device, would be outside the court's statutory competence.269
In contrast, when a plaintiff defeats federal jurisdiction, "a case depending on
state law merely remains in the state court.""27 Consequently, a plaintiff's
effort to defeat federal jurisdiction by pleading insufficient damages impli-
cates no statutory restriction and raises fewer policy concerns than an attempt
to manufacture jurisdiction.
When the Burns court insisted on the heavy "legal certainty" burden, it
adhered to congressional intent and policy behind the jurisdictional amount
as a bright line between federal and state jurisdiction.27 By requiring a
removing defendant to prove to a legal certainty that a plaintiff's facially
264. See supra notes 258-62 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent for
jurisdictional amount to limit access to federal courts).
265. See 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1994) (denying district courts jurisdiction over actions in
which plaintiff has improperly or collusively assigned claim to create federal jurisdiction).
266. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DivisIoN OF JuRIsDIcTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTs 160-61 (1969) [hereinafter ALI STUDY] (observing that "[t]he
avoidance of federal diversity jurisdiction has never been the subject of statutory ban"). In
1988, however, Congress did attempt to curtail the practice of plaintiffs naming fictitious
defendantsto destroy diversity and avoid removaljurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994)
("For purposes ofremoval under this chapter, the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious
names shall be disregarded.").
267. ALI STUDY, supra note 266, at 160.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id However, the ALI observed that the harder a plaintiff tries to defeat federal
jurisdiction, the more likely the plaintiff is motivated by a desire to place the defendant at a
substantial disadvantage. Id. Still, plaintiffs properly should be able to avoid federal jurisdic-
tion. See Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 110-13 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that
concern about plaintiff putting defendant at disadvantage "cannot defeat plaintiff's right to
retain as defendants those parties properly joined, even if the consequence is that defendants
must litigate in state court").
271. See Bums v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095-96 (1Ith Cir. 1994) (stating that
"legal certainty" standard "is consistent with case law and Congress's policy of limiting federal
diversity jurisdiction").
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insufficient claim is actually jurisdictionally sufficient, the court recognized
that a plaintiff's specific claim deserves considerable deference.2' Further,
the Burns court based its adoption of the "legal certainty" standard on law-
yers' duties of diligence and candor.2' Rather than combat bad faith plaintiff
manipulation of the amount in controversy with a lighter burden on removing
defendants, the court imposed a heavy burden on defendants and relied on the
duties of the plaintiff's lawyer as an officer of the court to ensure truthful
pleading.274 Likewise, the House Judiciary Committee in 1988 stated that
federal courts should apply the sanctions available for attorneys who sign bad
faith complaints under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure275
when reviewing jurisdictional allegations. 6 At least one federal district court
272. See id at 1095 (determining that plaintiff's specific claim in pleading that lawyer
signed deserves deference and presumption of truth).
273. See id (discussing court's reliance on lawyers' duties).
274. Id
275. FED. R Civ. P. 11. In pertinent part, Rule I 1 states:
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by
at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or, if the party is
not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party....
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by signing,
filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper,
an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances, -
(2)the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or,
if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; ....
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court
determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the con-
ditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms,
or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation.
Id. The Burns court cited the Alabama counterpart to Rule I I of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in stating that an attorney's duty of candor goes beyond any duty that consicence or
ethical codes impose. Burns, 31 F.3d at 1095 n.5.
276. SeeH.I REP.No. 100-889, at45 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982,6006
(discussing availability of Rule 11 sanctions to punish bad faith allegations affecting federal
jurisdiction). Further, Congress appears willing to tolerate some plaintiff manipulation of
pleadings to remain in state court. Burns, 31 F.3d at 1097 n. 12. The Commentary to the 1988
Revisions of28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) shows that Congress knew that an absolute one-year window
for removal might allow plaintiffs to temporarilyjoin nondiverse defendants to defeat removal.
Id. "Congress has recognized and accepted that, in some circumstances, plaintiff can and will
intentionally avoid federal jurisdiction." Id
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has agreed that Rule 11 sanctions, not judicial tinkering with statutory juris-
dictional requirements, should be used to prevent bad faith plaintiffmanipula-
tion of the removal statutes.2' In sum, the Burns "legal certainty" standard
not only comports with congressional use of the jurisdictional amount as a
bright line determinant of federal jurisdiction, but the court's reliance on
judicial sanctions is also consistent with congressional understanding.278
Finally, the "legal certainty" standard, while a high bar, is not an insur-
mountable hurdle for defendants.279 In Jackson v. American Bankers Insur-
ance Co.,2"' the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Alabama held that the defendant had met the burden of proving to a legal
certainty that the amount in controversy exceeded thejurisdictional amount.281
Printella B. Jackson sued two credit card issuers and several insurance compa-
nies in Alabama state court over the defendants' alleged failure to pay on
disability policies covering her credit card debt.282 The plaintiff's ad damnum
clause requested no more than $70,000 plus court costs, $5000 short of the
federal jurisdictional amount.283 The defendants removed, and the plaintiff
moved for remand.2"' The district court applied the Burns "legal certainty"
standard and concluded that the defendants had met the heavy burden based
on affidavits from a Yale law professor and from an Alabama attorney who
had published an article on large punitive damage awards in Alabama.285
The affidavit of George L. Priest, John M. Olin Professor of Law and
Economics at the Yale Law School, summarized his research which found that
277. See Robinsonv. Quality Ins. Co., 633 F. Supp. 572,577 (S.D. Ala. 1986) (discussing
proper judicial response to potential plaintiff manipulation of removal jurisdiction). The
Robinson court emphatically stated that should the plaintiff, which the court allowed to remain
in state court because of ajurisdictionally insufficient claim, again appear before the federal
court seeking damages in excess of the jurisdictional amount, "this Court will be hard pressed
to keep from applying sanctions to the plaintifffor having filed a frivolous pleading, namely the
amendment to the present complaint." Id.
278. But see Noble-Allgire, supra note 99, at 725-28 (arguing that "there is no persuasive
reason why the courts should apply a stricter standard to the defendant's estimate of damages
in a removal case than the court would apply to the plaintiff's estimate of damages in a com-
plaint filed directly in federal court").
279. See infra notes 280-91 and accompanying text (discussing case in which defendant
successfully met "legal certainty" burden and removed to federal court).
280. 976 F. Supp. 1450 (S.D. Ala. 1997).
281. See Jackson v. American Bankers Ins. Co., 976 F. Supp. 1450,1453 (S.D. Ala. 1997)
(holding that defendants met burden of proof under Burns in showing that amount in contro-
versy was sufficient for federal jurisdiction).
282. Id at 1450.
283. Id at 1451.
284. Id
285. Id. at 1451-53.
PLEADING TO STA YIN STATE COURT
out-of-state insurers suffered punitive damage verdicts in Alabama courts
averaging well over $1 million.286 The court also relied on the affidavit of
Forrest S. Latta, an Alabama attorney who had studied damage verdicts in the
state.287 Latta opined that the amount in controversy in the Jackson case was
"well in excess of $75,000. '288 However, the court disregarded defendants'
exhibit of copies of thirteen complaints filed by the plaintiffs law firm in
similar cases against nondiverse defendants in which the plaintiffs did not
limit the damages sought to below $75,000."8 The court, following Burns,
stated that the subjective intent of the plaintiffs counsel was not at issue; the
court must make an objective determination of the actual amount in contro-
versy.2" Even without the evidence of the subjective intent of the plaintiff s
counsel, the court concluded that the defendants had met the heavy burden of
the Burns standard.29' Thus, Jackson illustrates that the Burns standard may
restrict federal jurisdiction but is not an absolute bar to federal courts.
V. Conclusion
Removal jurisdiction for diversity cases exists to provide nonresident
defendants with a federal forum,292 but the amount in controversy requirement
limits access to federal courts to substantial cases.293 The jurisdictional
amount provides a mechanism for a plaintiff to ensure a state court forum by
pleading jurisdictionally insufficient damages.294 However, in many states, a
plaintiff's specific claim for damages does not limit the plaintiff s recovery
to that amount.295 Further, a statutory one-year window for removal opens the
door for a plaintiff to manipulate pleadings to remain in state court and yet
ultimately recover more than the federal jurisdictional amount.296 The poten-
286. Id at 1452.
287. Id at 1453.
288. Id. (quoting Latta Aff. 21).
289. Id.
290. Id
291. Id at 1453, 1455.
292. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (stating purpose of removal jurisdiction).
293. See supra notes 253-64 and accompanying text (examining congressional intent
animating amount in controversy requirement).
294. See supra notes 67-69, 77-101 and accompanying text (analyzing rule of St. Paul
Mercury and its application).
295. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text (discussing state counterparts to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c), which does not limit recovery to amount prayed for in
complaint).
296. See supra notes 33, 276 and accompanying text (discussing potential for plaintiff
manipulation because of one-year limit on removal in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)).
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tial for manipulation by plaintiffs has led some federal courts to allow a
removing defendant to challenge a plaintiff's specifically pleaded damage
claim.297
If, as those courts have found, specific jurisdictionally insufficient
damages no longer foreclose removal, the defendant's burden to prove the
jurisdictional amount at least should be a heavy one.298 Congress intends
that the jurisdictional amount restrict access to federal courts.299 As the
most onerous of the proposed burdens, the "legal certainty" standard of
Burns performs this access-limiting function better than the "preponderance
of the evidence" standard of De Aguilar II or the "reverse legal certainty"
standard proposed by the Kliebert dissent. Thus, federal courts should hold
a removing defendant to the higher standard when allowing that defendant to
challenge a plaintiff's specifically pleaded and jurisdictionally insufficient
damage claim.
297. See supra notes 107-110,202-04 and accompanying text (discussing courts' willing-
ness to allow challenge to specifically pleaded damages).
298. See supra notes 165-68,271-79 and accompanying text (arguing for heavy burden on
removing defendant).
299. See supra notes 253-64 and accompanying text (discussing Congressional intent for
jurisdictional amount).
